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March 4, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Attached

The attached telephonic report was given by Jerry Green (Jim Wiegart's superior) to Gerry Warren. It describes a message given by Davidoff to correspondent, Jim Wiegart. I have given copies to Sonnenfeldt and Smyser for comment.

Attachment

cc: Mr. Sonnenfeldt
Mr. Smyser

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

Boris Davidoff, Second Secretary
Jim Wieghart

This is one of a periodic series of meetings that have been held over the last year [REDACTED]

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At a meeting at noon today, Boris opened the session with intensive questioning concerning prospects of invasion of North Vietnam. He continually asked whether we were aware that China was almost ready to intervene and he pressed repeatedly for any information concerning possibilities of an invasion. He was well aware, of course, that Wieghart had just returned from 6 weeks in Vietnam, including several days in Khe Sanh, and after expressing alarm, he also seemed to be very much concerned, from his viewpoint, that China might make some move. He indicated that the Russians were worried about China.

They moved directly into the subject of the Mid-East which concerned most of the session and Wieghart had the impression that the Russians were terrified of Golda Meir, and he asked, "Don't you realize that she is trying to develop a confrontation between the U.S. and Russia. Don't you realize we have made all the concessions that we can."

He was emphatic that Egypt could not extend the cease fire beyond Sunday. He said repeatedly that Sadat is no Nassar, implying that Sadat had nothing like the control of the people that Nassar had, and he made it clear that the Soviets were worried that Israel was so cocky that they were planning military action. He was convinced the U.S. had upset the balance of power by giving the black box to Israel, referring to Israel's electronic counter radar equipment used in anti-missile operations and he protested over and over that the Russian policy in the Mid-East had been very moderate and stressed that nothing could be accomplished by U.S. -Soviet confrontation. He said it would not help the Soviets solve any of the problems and that they were unable to see, even if the United States emerged ahead in any confrontation in the Mid-East, it could not be seen how it would solve any problems for either side. He then asked if we (U.S.) didn't realize the Mid-East crisis was certain to be an issue in the Soviet Party Congress there the end of this month. He said generally the Party Congress was held to merely ratify what the government had done but occasionally the hard liners could run wild and force a change in direction, and was fearful this might be done if the Mid-East crisis continued. He said Berlin is not important to the Soviets now. He said it was important to the East Germans principally as a wedge to gain recognition by the West. Then he got back to the Mid-East subject and said that the United States had spent a lot of effort in trying to get Egypt to act as an independent nation instead of as a spokesman for all of the Arab people. He said, "You have accomplished that, why don't you take advantage of it." He repeated almost every hard line statement Golda Meir

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has made recently and seemed to be fearful of Israeli's intention. He expressed grave worry that Israel might reject any American pressure for moderation and initiate military action.